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ABSTRACT
We study conditions relating to the impossibility of agreeing
to disagree in models of interactive KD45 belief (in contrast
to models of S5 knowledge, which are used in nearly all
the agreements literature). We show that even when the
truth axiom is not assumed it turns out that players will
find it impossible to agree to disagree under fairly broad
conditions.1
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1. INTRODUCTION
One of the strongest assumptions underpinning the stan-
dard model of knowledge, known as S5, is the truth axiom,
which essentially states that ‘everything that a player knows
is true’. This is equivalent, from one perspective, to as-
serting that no mistakes are ever made in the processing of
signals.
Mistakes, of course, abound around us, and sometimes
such mistakes can have significant consequences. Consider,
for example the following scenario (a variation of an ex-
ample appearing in [Hart and Tauman (2004)]): There are
two traders. They trade on a daily basis, and since a trade
involves one trader selling and the other buying, they can
at least observe each others’ willingness to trade. We may
imagine that these two traders are the ‘market leaders’, in
the sense that their actions are followed by others in the
market and copied.
Let Ω be the set of all states of the world, with Ω con-
taining nine states; Ω = {1, 2, . . . , 9}. For simplicity we
will assume that there is a common prior p over Ω, with
p(ω) = 1/9 for all states ω. The private information of the
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two traders, Anne and Bob are summarized by partitions
ΠA and ΠB respectively, with
ΠA = 1234|5678|9
and
ΠB = 123|456|789.
One standard interpretation of the structure of such par-
titional knowledge is that Anne and Bob receive signals. If
the true state is 2, for example, Anne receives a signal that
enables her to rule out the states 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, and she there-
fore knows that the true state is one of 1, 2, 3, 4. Bob, at the
true state 3, receives a signal that enables him to rule out
the states 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, and he therefore knows that the true
state is one of 1, 2, 3. Specifically, suppose that Bob may re-
ceive any one of three signals, σ1, σ2, σ3, where σ1 informs
Bob that the true state is one of 1, 2, 3, σ2 informs Bob that
the true state is one of 4, 5, 6, and σ3 informs Bob that the
true state is one of 7, 8, 9 (we will be less interested in this
example with specifying Anne’s possible signals).
Signal States
σ1 → {1, 2, 3}
σ2 → {4, 5, 6}
σ3 → {7, 8, 9}
Figure 1: Bob’s signals and their interpretation
when there are no processing errors.
So far, so standard. Now consider the possibility of a
mistake in signals processing on the part of Bob. Suppose
that Bob inputs the signals he receives into a black box
that he has been assured outputs 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, or 7, 8, 9 if
the input is σ1,σ2, or σ3 respectively. Unbeknownst to Bob
(and to Anne), however, Bob’s black box is defective; when
either σ1 or σ2 are given as input, the box outputs 4, 5, 6
(hence even if, e.g., the true state is 1 Bob thinks the true
state is one of {4, 5, 6}.
Signal States
σ1 → {4, 5, 6}
σ2 → {4, 5, 6}
σ3 → {7, 8, 9}
Figure 2: Bob’s signal processing error.
Consider next the event E = {4, 9}. This event will be
interpreted as a ‘good’ outcome (e.g., company earnings are
about to rise), with the complement representing a ‘bad’
event that ought to trigger the sale of shares. Suppose that
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the true state is 2, and that each one of the two traders
behaves each day according to the following rule:{
Buy if the probability of E is 0.3 or more;
Sell if the probability of E is less than 0.3.
Given these assumptions, the following sequence of actions
transpires. On Day 1, Anne, who processes signals correctly,
supposes that the true state is one of 1, 2, 3, 4, judges the
probability of E to be 1/4 and seeks to sell shares. Bob
erroneously supposes that the true state is one of 4, 5, 6,
judges the probability of E to be 1/3, and therefore buys
shares from Anne.
Since Bob was willing to buy on Day 1, Anne ‘learns’ that
the true state is not in 1, 2, 3. She therefore erroneously
supposes on Day 2 that the true state is 4 and offers to buy
on Day 2. Bob does the same. By Day 3, it is ‘common
knowledge’ that 4 is the ‘true state’ – Bob’s error has now
become Anne’s error. Both traders seek to buy as many
shares as they can, to their detriment, and a bubble has
developed.
[Geanakoplos (1989)] and [Morris (1996)] show that in
knowledge models that satisfy the truth axiom (but are not
necessarily S5) more information is always beneficial for a
player, in the sense that with more information a rational
player will never choose an action that gives him less in ex-
pectation than an action that he chooses when he has less
information. Without the truth axiom, that no longer holds
true. Indeed, as the example here shows, without the truth
axiom, not only is the ‘mistaken’ player in danger of choosing
detrimental actions, his errors can cascade and ‘infect’ other
players to their detriment: in Day 1 above, Anne makes the
right decision in seeking to sell shares, but on Day 2, due
to Bob’s mistake, she is buying shares. Arguably, Anne has
been mistaken all along, in accepting Bob’s reports at face
value, without considering the possibility that Bob might be
mistaken.
The above story motivates the study of agreement and dis-
agreement in models of belief as opposed to models of knowl-
edge, which is the standard setting of most of the agreement
literature.
2. PRELIMINARIES
2.1 Belief Structures
Fix a finite set of players I and a finite set of states of the
world2 denoted by Ω. Subsets of Ω are called events. The
set of probability distributions over Ω is denoted by Δ(Ω).
A type function ti over Ω for player i is defined by as-
signing, for each ω, a probability distribution ti(ω) ∈ Δ(Ω)
representing player i’s beliefs at ω. We associate with each
type function ti a partition Πi of Ω defined
3 by Πi(ω) =
{ω′ | ti(ω′) = ti(ω)}. If we impose on a type function the
property that ti(ω)(Πi(ω)) = 1, then the type functions is
partitional. A probabilistic belief structure over Ω is then a
set of partitional type functions (ti)i∈I over Ω.
A function bi : Ω → 2Ω \ ∅ is a possibility function. The
event bi(ω) is interpreted as the set of states that are consid-
2 In the basic definitions of elements of belief structures we
largely follow [Samet (2011)].
3 The presentation here reverses most presentations of belief
structures, in which partitions are given and used to define
type functions; here we are starting with type functions and
using them to define the partitions.
ered possible for i at ω, while all other states are excluded by
i at ω. We will call a possibility function bi : Ω → 2Ω \ {∅}
that is measurable with respect to a partition Πi and satisfies
bi(ω) ⊆ Πi(ω) for each ω ∈ Ω a KD45 possibility function.
A belief structure over Ω is a set of pairs Π = (Πi, bi)i∈I ,
where each bi is a KD45 possibility function with respect to
the partition Πi of Ω. We will sometimes also call such a
structure a KD45 belief structure.
The general structure of a model of KD45 belief of a player
i is of an over-arching partition Πi, with each partition el-
ement π ∈ Πi furthermore partitioned into bi(ω) and fi(ω)
(using an arbitrary ω ∈ π). Every element ω′ ∈ fi(ω) is
mapped by bi into bi(ω), where it is ‘trapped’, in the sense
that bi(bi(ω
′)) = bi(ω′) = bi(ω).
A probabilistic belief structure (ti)i∈I over Ω induces a
belief structure (Πi, bi)i∈I over Ω, where Πi is the partition
of Ω into the types of player i and bi(ω) is the set of states
in Πi(ω) that have positive ti(ω) probability. Conversely,
every belief structure over Ω is induced by a probabilistic
belief structure over Ω. We will sometimes make use of this
by choosing, for a given belief structure Π = (Πi, bi)i∈I , an
arbitrary probabilistic belief structure (tbi )i∈I that induces
Π.
2.2 Delusion
LetΠ = (Πi, bi)i∈I be a belief structure. If ω ∈ bi(ω) then
bi is non-deluded at ω. If ω /∈ bi(ω) then bi is deluded at ω;
in this case we will also sometimes say that ω is a deluded
state for player i. This is where we are dropping the ‘truth
axiom’: if one accepts the truth axiom there are never any
deluded states for any player.
If there is at least one state at which bi is deluded, then bi
is delusional, and we will similarly say that the correspond-
ing belief operator Bi is delusional if this is the case. It is
straight-forward to show that a belief structure Π is non-
delusional for all players if and only if it is an S5 structure,
and it is similarly straight-forward to show that a state ω
is non-deluded for player i if and only if tbi (ω) = 0 for any
probabilistic belief structure (tbi )i∈I that induces Π.
Definition 1. AKD45 belief structure at which at all states
ω ∈ Ω either a) every player i is deluded at ω or b) every
player i is non-deluded at ω will be called a non-singular
structure. 
In examples, we will compactly express KD45 belief struc-
tures by separating states in different partition elements of
Πi by the square boxes. Within each partition element we
will denote states that are in the same component of bi(ω)
by an oval box.
For example, if we write




1 2 3 4 5




6 7 8




9
then the intention is, for example, that 5, 6 and 7 are all in
the same partition element, i.e., Πi(5) = {5, 6, 7}, but 5 is a
delusional state such that bi(5) = {6, 7}.
3. BELIEF REVISION
The general approach we will follow is: in standard S5
concepts and formulae, replace Πi by bi and see what hap-
pens. We will apply this now to Bayesian belief revision.
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3.1 Standard belief revision and priors
Let μ be a probability distribution over Ω, and let Πi be a
partition of of Ω. The (standard) revision of μ at ω according
to Πi is the probability distribution μ̂(ω) such that
μ̂(ω)(ω′) =
{
μ(ω′)
μ(Πi(ω))
if ω′ ∈ Πi(ω)
0 otherwise
(1)
if μ(Πi(ω)) > 0; otherwise it is undefined.
We may interpret this as follows: ex ante the player has
a prior probability distribution of full support. When up-
dating following a signal, the player excludes states outside
bi(ω), i.e. gives them zero probability. Since the player mis-
takes the reading of the signal, it is possible that he or she
ends up giving the true state ω zero probability.
Let f be a random variable over Ω, μ be a probability
distribution over Ω, and Πi a partition of Ω. Then the con-
ditional expected value of f at ω is
Eμi (f | Πi(ω)) :=
1
μ(Πi(ω))
∑
ω′∈Πi(ω)
f(ω′)μ(ω)(ω′), (2)
if μ(Πi(ω)) = 0 (otherwise it is not defined).
Let (ti)i∈I be a probabilistic belief structure over Ω, with
(Πi)i∈I the corresponding partition. A (standard) prior for
ti is a probability distribution μ ∈ Δ(Ω), such that μ̂(ω) =
ti(ω) at each ω, where μ̂(ω) is the standard revision of μ at
ω according to Πi as defined in Equation (1). A (standard)
common prior for (ti)i∈I is a probability distribution μ ∈
Δ(Ω) that is a prior for each ti.
Given a probabilistic belief structure (ti)i∈I with corre-
sponding partition (Pi)i∈I , player i’s posterior expected value
of f at ω is
Etii (f | Πi(ω)) :=
∑
ω′∈Πi(ω)
ti(ω
′)f(ω′). (3)
If there is a common prior μ, then for any random vari-
able f the posterior expected value of each player equals the
conditional expected value of f relative to μ and Πi, i.e.,
Etii (f | Πi(ω)) = Eμi (f | Πi(ω)).
3.2 Delusional belief revision
Now replace Πi by bi in Equations (1) and (3).
Let μ be a probability distribution over Ω, and let bi be a
belief structure over Ω with corresponding partition Πi. We
introduce here the delusional revision of μ at ω according to
bi, defining it as the probability distribution μ̂(ω) such that
μ̂(ω)(ω′) =
{
μ(ω′)
μ(bi(ω))
if ω′ ∈ bi(ω)
0 otherwise
(4)
if μ(bi(ω)) > 0; otherwise it is undefined.
Let f be a random variable over Ω, let μ be a probability
distribution over Ω, and let bi be a belief structure over Ω
with corresponding partition Πi. Then the delusional con-
ditional expected value of f at ω according to bi is
Eμi (f | bi(ω)) :=
1
μ(bi(ω))
∑
ω′∈bi(ω)
f(ω′)μ(ω)(ω′), (5)
if μ(Πi(ω)) = 0 (otherwise it is not defined).
Let (ti)i∈I be a probabilistic belief structure over Ω, with
(Πi)i∈I the corresponding partition. Let bi be the belief
structure induced by ti. A delusional prior for ti is a proba-
bility distribution μ ∈ Δ(Ω), such that μ̂(ω) = ti(ω) at each
ω, where μ̂(ω) is the delusional revision of μ at ω according
to bi as defined in Equation (4). A common delusional prior
for (ti)i∈I is a probability distribution μ ∈ Δ(Ω) that is a
prior for each ti.
Let φi be a standard prior for ti, and suppose that for
a state ω, ti(ω)(ω) = 0, and therefore that ω ∈ Πi(ω) but
ω /∈ bi(ω). Then by Equation (1) it must be the case that
φi(ω) = 0. The same reasoning does not hold for a delusional
prior; a standard prior is a delusional prior, but the converse
is not necessarily true.
Example 1. Consider a one-player probabilistic belief struc-
ture over a state space Ω = {ω1, ω2, ω3} defined by
t(ωk)(ω1) = 0; t(ωk)(ω2) =
1
2
; t(ωk)(ω3) =
1
2
for k ∈ {1, 2, 3}:
t =
0︷︸︸︷
ω1
1
2︷︸︸︷
ω2
1
2︷︸︸︷
ω3 .
This induces a belief structure
b(ω1) = b(ω2) = b(ω3) = {ω2, ω3},
with ω1 a deluded state, visualised as
ω1




ω2 ω3
The probability structure has only one (standard) prior,
μ = (0, 1/2, 1/2), but it has an infinite number of delusional
priors. The set of delusional priors includes, for example,
(0, 1/2, 1/2) and (1/3, 1/3, 1/3). 
3.3 Interpersonal Belief Credibility
S5 knowledge structures, by dint of satisfying the truth
axiom, satisfy the property that
⋂
i∈I bi(ω) = ∅ for all states
ω ∈ Ω.
In KD45 belief structures there may be states at which⋂
i∈I bi(ω) = ∅. When ⋂
i∈I
bi(ω) = ∅
for all states ω we will say that the belief structure satisfies
interpersonal belief credibility.
4. COMMON BELIEF
Denote b(ω) =
⋃
i∈I bi(ω) and let b
m be the composition
of the function k repeated m times. Furthermore, define for
each ω the common belief set bQ(ω) of ω in Ω by
bQ(ω) :=
⋃
m≥1
bm(ω) (6)
S5 knowledge structures are naturally partitioned into
common knowledge components. Let {Ω, (ki)i∈I)} be a knowl-
edge structure. The meet is the finest common coarsening
of the players’ partitions. Each element of the meet of Π
is called a common knowledge component of Π. Denote by
C(ω) the common knowledge component of a state ω in a
knowledge structure.
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Let T ⊆ Ω be a common knowledge component. T can
be characterised in several ways. One way is by knowledge
chains. Defining k : Ω → 2Ω by k(ω) := ⋃i∈I Πi(ω) and
for m ≥ 0 letting km be the composition of the function k
repeated m times, it is well known that T =
⋃
m≥1 k
m(ω)
for any ω ∈ T .
In addition, in S5 knowledge structures, a common knowl-
edge component at ω can be characterised by the fact that
C(ω) =
⋃
ω∈T
Πi(ω).
for all players i ∈ I
The corresponding statement in KD45 does not hold, i.e.,
it is not always the case that bQ(ω) =
⋃
ω′∈Ω0 bi(ω
′) for some
ω0 ⊆ Ω. When it does we will want to take note of this.
Definition 2. There is strong common belief in truth at a
state ω if there exists Ω0 ⊆ Ω such that bQ(ω) = ⋃ω′∈Ω0 bi(ω′)
for all i ∈ I. 
Proposition 1. There is strong common belief in truth
at every state iff the belief structure is non-singular.
5. AGREEMENT INBELIEF STRUCTURES
5.1 Standard No Betting
Definition 3. An n-tuple of random variables {f1, . . . , fn}
is a bet if
∑n
i=1 fi = 0. 
Definition 4. Let (ti)i∈I be a probabilistic belief struc-
ture. Then a bet is an agreeable bet at ω (relative to (ti))
if Etii (f | Πi(ω)) > 0 for all i ∈ I. A bet f is a common
knowledge agreeable bet at ω if it is common knowledge at ω
that f is an agreeable bet. 
The main characterisation of the existence of common pri-
ors in S5 knowledge models in the literature is what is some-
times known as the No Betting Theorem: a finite type space
has a common prior if and only if there does not exist a com-
mon knowledge agreeable bet at any ω. In the special case of
a two-player probabilistic belief structure where the random
variable is the characteristic function
1H(ω) =
{
1 if ω ∈ H
0 if ω /∈ H
where H is an event, this characterisation implies the semi-
nal Aumann Agreement Theorem ([Aumann (1976)]), which
states that if it is common knowledge at a state of the world
that player 1 ascribes probability η1 to event H and player
2 ascribes probability η2 to the same event, then η1 = η2.
5.2 KD45 No Betting
Definition 5. Let (ti)i∈I be a probabilistic belief structure
and (bi)i∈I a belief structure induced by (ti)i∈I . A bet f is
a common belief agreeable bet at ω if it is common belief at
ω that f is an agreeable bet. 
With these definitions, we can now ask whether an ana-
logue to the No Betting Theorem of S5 models holds in the
KD45 setting. Given a probabilistic belief structure (ti)i∈I ,
does the existence of a common delusional prior imply that
there is no common belief agreeable bet?
The answer to this question is no, as the following exam-
ple4 shows.
Example 2. Let Ω = {ω1, ω2, ω3}. Consider the two-
player probabilistic belief structure (t1, t2) defined by
t1(ωk)(ω1) =
1
3
; t1(ωk)(ω2) =
1
3
; t1(ωk)(ω3) =
1
3
,
and
t2(ωk)(ω1) = 0; t2(ωk)(ω2) =
1
2
; t2(ωk)(ω3) =
1
2
for k ∈ {1, 2, 3}:
t1 =
1
3︷︸︸︷
ω1
1
3︷︸︸︷
ω2
1
3︷︸︸︷
ω3 ,
t2 =
0︷︸︸︷
ω1
1
2︷︸︸︷
ω2
1
2︷︸︸︷
ω3 .
This induces the belief structure (b1, b2)
b1(ω1) = b1(ω2) = b1(ω3) = {ω1, ω2, ω3},
and
b2(ω1) = b2(ω2) = b2(ω3) = {ω2, ω3},
visualised as




ω1 ω2 ω3
ω1




ω2 ω3
For this belief structure, μ = (1/3, 1/3, 1/3) is a common
delusional prior. Let H = {ω1, ω2}. Then it is common
belief at every state ω that Et11 (1
H | b1(ω)) = 2/3, while
Et22 (1
H | b2(ω)) = 1/2. 
To recapitulate something resembling the No Betting The-
orem in belief structures, we add a new definition.
Definition 6. There is weak common belief in truth5 at a
state ω if there exists a state ω′ ∈ bQ(ω) at which there is
strong common belief in truth. 
An equivalent way of stating the content of Definition 6
is as follows: there is weak common belief in truth at ω iff
there exists a state ω′ ∈ bQ(ω) such that⋃
ω′′∈bQ(ω′)
bi(ω
′′) =
⋃
ω′′∈bQ(ω′)
bj(ω
′′)
for all i, j ∈ I. This can be read intuitively as the players
‘eventually’ getting to strong common belief in truth as they
follow chains in the common belief set.
A belief structure version of the No Betting Theorem can
be attained if we assume weak common belief in truth.
4 This example is inspired by an example in [Collins (1997)].
5 Although weak common belief in truth may seem abstract
at first reading, it arises naturally in the study of interactive
belief models. Concepts very similar to that of weak com-
mon belief in truth are introduced and used in [Battigalli
and Bonanno (1999)] and [Tarbush (2011)].
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Theorem 1. Let (ti)i∈I be a probabilistic belief structure
over Ω and let ω be a state at which there is weak common
belief in truth. Then there is a common delusional prior if
and only if there is no common belief agreeable bet at ω.
Since strong common belief in truth implies weak com-
mon belief in truth, and in a non-singular probabilistic be-
lief structure there is strong common belief in truth at ev-
ery state, Theorem 2 (which is close in content to a result
appearing in [Bonanno and Nehring (1999)]) follows from
Theorem 1 as a corollary.
Theorem 2. Let (ti)i∈I be a non-singular probabilistic
belief structure over Ω. Then there is a common delusional
prior if and only if there is no common belief agreeable bet
at any state ω ∈ Ω.
Example 3. The state space consists of {0, 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7}.
There are two players, i and j. The belief structure
((Πi, bi), (Πj , bj))
is as follows:
Player i’s beliefs are




1




2 3 4




5




6 7
Player j’s beliefs are




1 2 3 4




5 6 7
The states 3 and 4 are delusional states for both player i
and player j, hence they perceive the same world. Note also
that bi(3) = {5} while bj(3) = {1, 2}, and this structure
therefore does not satisfy interpersonal belief credibility. In
fact, the structure can naturally be divided into two ‘certainty
components’, {1, 2} and {5, 6, 7}; at states 3 and 4, player i
is certain that the true component is {5, 6, 7} while player j
is certain that the true component is {1, 2}.
The above belief structure can be induced by the following
non-singular probabilistic belief structure (ti, tj):
ti =
1︷︸︸︷
1
1︷︸︸︷
2
0︷︸︸︷
3
0︷︸︸︷
4
1︷︸︸︷
5
1/2︷︸︸︷
6
1/2︷︸︸︷
7
tj =
1/2︷︸︸︷
1
1/2︷︸︸︷
2
0︷︸︸︷
3
0︷︸︸︷
4
1/3︷︸︸︷
5
1/3︷︸︸︷
6
1/3︷︸︸︷
7
This probabilistic belief structure has an infinite number
of common delusional priors; for example,
μ = (
1
7
,
1
7
,
1
14
,
1
14
,
1
7
,
1
7
,
1
7
).
There can therefore be no common belief disagreement.
We close by noting the following. Suppose that are work-
ing in the standard S5 knowledge model (hence that the play-
ers make ‘no mistakes’, that is, they revise beliefs perfectly
correctly), and that the players start out with two separate
priors, given by
μi = (
1
7
,
1
7
,
1
28
,
3
28
,
1
7
,
1
7
,
1
7
)
and
μj = (
1
7
,
1
7
,
1
14
,
1
14
,
1
7
,
1
7
,
1
7
).
Then the players will revise their beliefs into the following
posteriors
t̂i =
1︷︸︸︷
1
1︷︸︸︷
2
1/8︷︸︸︷
3
3/8︷︸︸︷
4
1/2︷︸︸︷
5
1/2︷︸︸︷
6
1/2︷︸︸︷
7
t̂j =
1/3︷︸︸︷
1
1/3︷︸︸︷
2
1/6︷︸︸︷
3
1/6︷︸︸︷
4
1/3︷︸︸︷
5
1/3︷︸︸︷
6
1/3︷︸︸︷
7 .
Defining a bet (fi,−fi) by
fi = (1/4, 1/4,−6, 3,−1/8, 1/32, 1/32),
it can be checked that this bet is common knowledge agree-
able at every state. But if the players make mistakes, using
delusional revision with both players having deluded states
at 3 and 4, then instead of t̂i and t̂j they will derive the
posteriors ti and tj , which as we have seen have a common
delusional prior precluding disagreement. 
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APPENDIX
Proof of Theorem 1. We first add a definition and a
lemma, for the sake of proving the theorem.
Definition 7. Let (ti)i∈I be a probabilistic belief structure
over Ω with corresponding partition profile Π := (Πi)i∈I ,
and let X ⊂ Ω be a subset of Ω. Define Π restricted to
X, denoted ΠX , to be the partition profile over X given by
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ΠXi (ω) := Πi(ω)∩X for any state ω. Further, for each i ∈ I
let tXi be any type function over (X,Π
X) that satisfies the
property that for any ω ∈ Ω, ti(ω)(ΠXi )tXi (ω) = ti(ω). 
Intuitively, ΠXi is the partition of X derived from the par-
tition Πi of Ω by ‘ignoring all states outside of X’. It then
follows intuitively that tXi (ω), for each state ω ∈ X, is ti(ω)
scaled relative to the other states in ΠXi (ω) in such a way
that
∑
ω∈X t
X
i (ω) = 1.
For a random variable f , denote
EXi (f | ΠXi (ω)) :=
∑
ω′∈ΠXi (ω)
tXi (ω
′)f(ω′).
A bet {f1, . . . , fn} is an agreeable bet relative to (tXi )i at
ω ∈ X if EXi (f | ω) > 0 for all i ∈ I. We will say that it
is simply an agreeable relative to (tXi )i if it is an agreeable
bet relative to (tXi )i at all states ω ∈ X.
Lemma 1. Let (ti)i∈I be a probabilistic belief structure
over Ω, let ω ∈ Ω and let X be a non-empty subset of bQ(ω),
the common belief set of ω. Suppose that there exists an
agreeable bet relative to (tXi )i. Then there exists an agree-
able bet relative to bQ(ω).
Proof. Let f be an agreeable bet relative to (tXi )i. If
X = bQ(ω), there is nothing to prove.
Otherwise, we distinguish a few cases:
1. Suppose that there exists a state ω′′ ∈ X such that
bi(ω
′′) \ X = ∅ for some i ∈ I. Let ω′ ∈ bi(ω′′) \ X
(hence ti(ω
′) > 0), and let ε := EXi (fi | ΠXi (ω′)) =
EXi (fi | ΠXi (ω′′)). By assumption, ε > 0 (since f is an
agreeable bet relative to (tXi )i). Set Y := X ∪ ω′.
Next, let f i(ω
′) be a negative real number satisfying
0 > f i(ω
′) >
−(1− tYi (ω′))
tYi (ω
′)
ε ,
and for j = i, set f j(ω′) := −f i(ω′)/(n−1) > 0, where
n = |I|.
Clearly, by construction,
∑
j∈I f j(ω
′) = 0. Complete
the definition of f by letting f(ω′′′) := f(ω′′′) for all
ω′′′ ∈ X. It is straightforward to check that f is an
agreeable bet relative to (tYi )i∈I .
2. Suppose that there is a state ω′ ∈ bQ(ω) \X such that
bi(ω
′) ∩X = ∅. Set Y := X ∪ ω′.
We distinguish two sub-cases:
(a) If ti(ω
′) = 0, then for all j ∈ I \ i let f j(ω′) be
any arbitrary positive number, and set f i(ω
′) =
−∑j∈I\i f j(ω′). Then f is an agreeable bet rela-
tive to (tYi )i∈I .
(b) If ti(ω
′) > 0, let ε := EXi (fi | ΠXi (ω′)). By as-
sumption, ε > 0 (since bi(ω
′) ∩X = ∅ and f is an
agreeable bet relative to (tXi )i). From this point,
define f j for all j ∈ I exactly as in Case 1 above,
yielding an agreeable bet relative to (tYi )i∈I .
Now simply repeat this procedure as often as necessary
to extend the agreeable bet to every state in the finite set
bQ(ω).
Completion of the proof of Theorem 1. Let (ti)i∈I be
a probabilistic belief structure over Ω, and let ω be a state
at which there is weak common belief in truth, and hence
there is ω′ ∈ bQ(ω) at which there is strong common belief
in truth, i.e., ⋃
ω′′∈bQ(ω′)
bi(ω
′′) =
⋃
ω′′∈bQ(ω′)
bj(ω
′′)
for all i, j ∈ I. If we restrict attention solely to the states in
bQ(ω′), we can consider the operators bi for all i to constitute
an S5 knowledge structure over bQ(ω).
In one direction, suppose that there is a common delu-
sional prior μ. Then μ restricted to bQ(ω′) is a common
(standard) prior over bQ(ω′) regarded as a knowledge struc-
ture, hence there can be no common knowledge agreeable bet
at any state in bQ(ω′). If there were a common belief agree-
able bet at ω, then that bet would be a common knowledge
agreeable bet over bQ(ω′) regarded as a knowledge structure,
which we just showed cannot happen. The contradiction es-
tablishes that there is no common belief agreeable bet at
ω.
In the other direction, suppose that there is no common
delusional prior. Then there can be no common (standard)
prior over bQ(ω′) regarded as a knowledge structure, because
if there were such a prior μ, it could be extended to a com-
mon delusional prior μ̂ over all of bQ(ω) simply by setting
μ̂(ω′′) =
{
μ(ω′′) if ω′′ ∈ bQ(ω′)
0 otherwise.
We can then apply the standard No Betting Theorem for
knowledge structures to conclude that there is a common
knowledge agreeable bet {f1, . . . , fn} over bQ(ω′) as a knowl-
edge structure, which is a common belief agreeable bet over
bQ(ω′) as a belief structure. Applying Lemma 1, this can be
extended to a common belief agreeable bet over all of bQ(ω),
which is what was needed to be shown.
110
